

Born in Power

20 Years of the *Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (2002-2022)*





The [Congo Research Group \(CRG\)](#) was founded in 2015 to promote rigorous, independent research into the violence that affects millions of Congolese. This requires a broad approach. For us, the roots of this violence can be found in a history of predatory governance that dates back to the colonial period and that connects the hillsides of the Kivus with political intrigue and corruption in Kinshasa, as well as in the capitals of Europe, China, and North America. Today, CRG's research aims to explain the complicated interplay among politics, violence, and political economy in the Congo to a wide audience.

[Ebuteli](#) is a Congolese research institute on politics, governance, and violence. Ebuteli ("staircase" in Lingala) aims to promote, through rigorous research, an informed debate to find solutions to the many challenges facing the DRC.



This report was made possible thanks to funding from the European Union's Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Swedish International Development Agency. The contents are the sole responsibility of CRG and Ebuteli, its research partner in DRC. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or Sweden.



Table of Contents

Introduction.....	6
Born In Power.....	6
Factions, Coalitions, and Electoral Strategies.....	8
Mzeeistes and Josephistes: Bringing Together the Old and the New.....	8
Text Box: Proportional Representation in the DRC.....	9
2002-2018: Staying in Power.....	10
Text Box: Centralization and Fragmentation in Congolese Politics.....	12
The <i>Initiateur</i> and the <i>Caciques</i> : Joseph Kabila and His Court.....	13
Party Structures and Operations: Ideology, Accountability.....	14
Ideology.....	14
Accountability.....	15
Conclusion.....	16
Recommendations.....	17
Annexes.....	18
Endnotes.....	23



About the “Mukalenga wa Bantu” Series

In October 2022, the [Congo Research Group](#) (CRG) and its research partner Ebuteli launched a series of reports on democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This project focuses on structures of mobilization as a means of scrutinizing conduits of accountability in the country.

Congolese overwhelmingly believe in electing their leaders—in our recent poll with the *Bureau d'études, de recherches et de consulting international* (BERCI), 77% said this was the best form of governing; very few would like to return to the days of single-party or military rule. And yet, most Congolese are not happy with what democracy has provided. Only 37.5% express some degree of trust in the central government; that same figure is 32% for the national assembly.

What explains this gap between democracy's popularity and dissatisfaction with the government and elected officials? There are many factors that contribute to the country's democratic weaknesses. Much of the focus has been on the electoral process itself—the electoral commission, the court system, and allegations of vote rigging. CRG and Ebuteli will soon be publishing such an analysis in preparation for the upcoming 2023 polls. Other analyses have highlighted the need for civic education and the dysfunctions of the media ecosystem in the Congo.

This series of reports takes a different approach, focusing on the various channels of popular mobilization in the country that influence the government's behavior. The title of this series—“*Mukalenga wa bantu, bantu wa mukalenga*” (the leader exists thanks to the people, and vice versa)—a saying from Kasai, indicates the need for leaders to be accountable to the people, while at the same time citizens have a duty to mobilize and make themselves heard.

Political parties themselves are the most obvious example of this kind of structure. This report looks at the *Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie* (PPRD), the first of two on political parties in this series. The next one will be on the *Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social* (UDPS). Together, these are arguably the two most important parties to arise since democratization began in 1990. The argument here is clear: the degree to which political parties can forge internal mechanisms of accountability and a coherent ideology will influence how they govern.

We also consider other mobilization structures that do not aspire to governing, but which are vital to a functioning democracy. Our first report examined the role of the Catholic Church in the country's democracy, while another will analyze the state of civil society in this current democratic moment. The Congo is a plural society, and these kinds of institutions—and we will highlight their strengths and flaws—have contributed to the vitality of its democracy: protestors have ensured term limits had to be respected, and a majority of parliamentarians are not reelected when citizens go to the polls.

Not all mobilization structures are this benign, however. For example, our last report in this series will examine how politicians have used football teams as a means of influencing elections and boosting their popularity.

All of these reports will be published on our website and over social media. We benefit from your insights—hold us accountable, as well, by sending us an email (info@ebuteli.org, info@congoresearchgroup.org) or tagging us on social media (@GEC_CRG, @ebuteli).

Glossary of Acronyms

ABAKO	<i>Association des Bakongo</i>
AFDL	<i>Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo</i>
AMP	<i>Alliance pour la majorité présidentielle</i>
ANAPI	<i>Agence nationale pour la promotion des investissements</i>
ANC	African National Congress
BERCI	<i>Bureau d'études, de recherches et de consulting international</i>
CACH	<i>Cap pour le changement</i>
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CENCO	<i>Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo</i>
CENI	<i>Commission électorale nationale indépendante</i>
CNDH	<i>Commission national des droits de l'homme</i>
CONAKAT	<i>Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga</i>
CPP	<i>Comités du pouvoir populaire</i>
CRG	Congo Research Group
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FCC	<i>Front commun pour le Congo</i>
FRC	<i>Force révolutionnaire du changement</i>
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
MLC	<i>Mouvement pour la libération du Congo</i>
MNC	<i>Mouvement national congolais</i>
MP	<i>Majorité présidentielle</i>
MPLA	<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i>
MPR	<i>Mouvement populaire pour la révolution</i>
PALU	<i>Parti lumumbiste unifié</i>
PCT	<i>Parti congolais du travail</i>
PNP	<i>Parti national du progrès</i>
PPC	<i>Parti du peuple congolais</i>
PPPD	<i>Parti du peuple pour la paix et la démocratie</i>
PPRD	<i>Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie</i>
RCD	<i>Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie</i>
RCD/K-ML	<i>Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani-mouvement de libération</i>
RRC	<i>Rassemblement pour la reconstruction du Congo</i>
SG	<i>Secrétaire général</i>
SP	<i>Secrétaire permanent</i>
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UDEMO	<i>Union de démocrates mobutistes</i>
UDPS	<i>Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social</i>
UNC	<i>Union pour la nation congolaise</i>
USN	<i>Union sacrée de la nation</i>
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front



Introduction

This report sets out to understand the paradox of democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): the population is deeply invested in multiparty democracy, and yet that form of government has provided little in terms of tangible results. Levels of political mobilization are high, if one is to count the dizzying array of political parties and civil society actors. Yet there is little accountability between the executive and the people's elected representatives, on the one hand, and the population on the other.

In this series, this report and the following one examine the two political parties that have shaped the past two decades of Congolese democracy like no other: the *Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie* (PPRD) and the *Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social* (UDPS). Political parties are the main and most obvious vector for political ambitions in democracies, connecting parliament and the executive to the population through the electoral process. In the Congo, however, parties are deeply flawed. They are, largely speaking, a means for their members—especially their leadership—to accumulate resources and then distribute patronage. They are poorly developed in terms of ideology and policy platforms, which undermines accountability and democratic debate; and they depend heavily on charismatic leadership.

Here, we examine the case of the PPRD, the political party of former president Joseph Kabila, created in 2002 and the central party in the ruling coalition for the following sixteen years. Through 35 interviews with PPRD and *Front commun pour le Congo* members, cadres, and militants, we paint a picture of a party that has undergone numerous setbacks in the past two years.¹ The party now finds itself in an existential crisis for a handful of interconnected reasons. As a party that began its existence already in power, it has never—until now—needed to understand or practice the art of opposition politics. Like other Congolese political parties, its ideology and platform are of secondary importance for most members to the distribution of patronage and posts—the ties that bind within political parties in other parts of the world—are fragile in the PPRD.

We examine three aspects of the PPRD. First, the report looks at the historical conditions of its creation and its role in Congolese politics since the Sun City Accords. Second, it looks at the PPRD's strategies for staying in power between 2002 and 2018. Third, it highlights the lack of significance of ideology within the PPRD, as well as the lack of accountability of the leadership to the party base.

Born In Power

“The PPRD was born in power.” *Le PPRD est né au pouvoir.* A version of this phrase was uttered by virtually every person interviewed by CRG and Ebuteli for this report.² Besides the stated devotion to Kabila himself, it was the single comment that nearly all present and past party leaders and activists agreed on.

The Sun City Accords, signed in 2002 and implemented in 2003, created an institutional template for Congo's emergence from civil war. The agreement's *parties et composantes*—the parties to the political settlement—included armed groups, the country's nonviolent opposition, civil society, and the Congolese government. This last party was the group of people in control of around half of the country, including the capital Kinshasa and the mining hub of Lubumbashi, but which had not coalesced into a well-structured political organization. Each of the signatories agreed, as part of the political transition (2003-2006), to become part of a multiparty, democratic political process that would eventually culminate in what were the country's first democratic elections in decades.³ Armed groups such as the *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) and *Mouvement pour la libération du Congo* (MLC) already had a natural political organization, and a future party name. Who or what would represent the “Congolese government?”

Enter the PPRD. The party, created on March 30, 2002, is a creature of its time. The name itself illustrates this: “reconstruction” evokes its creation during an ostensibly post-conflict period. Future founding members debated whether the final “D” in the name would stand for “development” or “democracy.” After some discussion, it was decided that the notion of development was already included in the concept of reconstruction.⁴ An early proposal for the party name—*Parti du peuple congolais* (PPC)—was rejected because it was felt that the acronym was too close to CPP⁵—the political movement associated with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the president who had come to power in 1997 after the fall of president Mobutu Sese Seko (see below).⁶

The conversion from a wartime government to a political party also marked an uneasy transition from the regime of Laurent Kabila to that of his son, Joseph. The former had gained power with support from the Rwandan and Ugandan armies under the banner of the *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo* (AFDL). In April 1999, two years after coming to power, Laurent Kabila dissolved the AFDL, replacing it with the *Comités de pouvoir populaire* (CPP)—“People's Power Committees.”⁷ These committees were intended to replace poli-



tical parties and, following the thought of Laurent Kabila, were explicitly opposed to them. He argued that political parties had created fractious political conditions which led to “chaos,” and Congo’s subjugation to imperialist powers.⁸ The CPP was thus also made in the image of a party-state⁹, even as it purported to bring “power to the people”¹⁰ and was not, according to Laurent Kabila himself, a political party.¹¹ Following Kabila’s assassination in 2001 and the ascension of his son Joseph to power, the government changed course: in May 2001, Joseph Kabila signed a law revoking the ban on political parties.¹²

Among past and present party members, there are conflicting views on what drove the creation of the PPRD, and whether it was Joseph Kabila’s idea, that of people close to him, or that of outsiders involved in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), the formal name for the Sun City negotiations, in reference to the South African resort where they occurred. One source, a former advisor to Joseph Kabila, suggested that the idea to create a political party for the government component participating in the negotiations came from South African president Thabo Mbeki. According to this source, Mbeki encouraged Kabila to do so in order to bring the Congo into a multiparty political system.¹³ Another source, however, pointed to the fact that Kabila never ran as a PPRD candidate for president as one of the signs that he was not as invested in creating or maintaining the PPRD as the party members were invested in him.¹⁴

Nevertheless, as *Initiateur* (Initiator)—a term used in the party’s statutes that reflects his centrality to the PPRD’s existence—Joseph Kabila designated people to draft various documents that would become the party’s founding texts. According to Professor Théophile Mbemba, who was Joseph Kabila’s chief of staff at the time of the party’s founding in 2002, the latter designated two groups to draft the first set of statutes for what became the PPRD.¹⁵ A first group, headed by Mbemba, included Ghislain Chikez Diemu (then vice minister of the interior), Léonard Ntwaremba (DRC government commissioner general for MONUC relations), and Bernard Ntendi and Jean-Pierre Ndeko, both of whom were presidential advisors. Évariste Boshab, then deputy chief of staff to the president and who subsequently held a series of important posts under Joseph Kabila¹⁶, supervised the work of this first commission while Mbemba participated in the Sun City negotiations. A second group that amended the draft of the first group included some of the most influential members of the government and presidency under Joseph Kabila: Vital Kamerhe (former president of the national assembly and former secretary general of the PPRD), Claudel André Lubaya (former governor of Kasai Occidental), André Masiala Ma Solo (former minister of higher education), Marie-Ange Lukiana (former minister of gender),

Mathias Buabua wa Kayembe (former *directeur général* of the *Agence nationale pour la promotion des investissements*, ANAPI), Augustin Katumba Mwanke (former governor of Katanga and a close advisor to Joseph Kabila until his death in 2012), Barnabé Kikaya Bin Karubi (former diplomatic advisor to Joseph Kabila), Jean Mbuyu (former special security advisor to Joseph Kabila), and Léonard Mashako Mamba (former minister of health). The amended texts were finally submitted, debated, and adopted at the party’s founding congress in 2002.

One of the objectives in launching a political party was to secure the interests of the DRC government in the emerging political settlement of the ICD. As noted above, other belligerents and parties to the Congolese conflict, such as the RCD, MLC, and *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani-mouvement de libération* (RCD/K-ML) were also planning their transformation into political parties. The non-violent political opposition—including the UDPS—also intended to participate in the new multiparty political process and elections that were to mark the end of the political transition envisioned by the Sun City Accords.

The interests of the Congolese government at the time cannot, however, be reduced to securing power and access to state resources. Two sources argued that to the extent that there is a link between the ideas of Laurent Kabila and the PPRD, it can be found in the notion of creating a truly national party, engaged in promoting a united, sovereign Congo.¹⁷ At its inception, at least, this appears to have been one of the ideas animating the party. All four versions of the PPRD’s statutes (2002, 2006, 2011, 2018) begin with a preamble emphasizing past violations of Congolese sovereignty, its exploitation by foreign actors, and the “betrayal” of the country by some of its native sons (see [Annex I](#)).

There are, nevertheless, different points of view within the party about the true ideological legacy of “Mzee”¹⁸ Laurent-Désiré Kabila and its impact on the PPRD. Laurent Kabila ostensibly began his political life as a Lumumbist before developing into a Marxist leader inspired by the Chinese example.¹⁹ Some of the companions of Mzee Kabila who were part of the CPP were reluctant to allow the creation of political parties at all—this was anathema to his view that political parties were divisive or subject to manipulation by foreign powers to the detriment of Congolese.²⁰ Several people among the PPRD’s founding members felt that the Marxist bent of the CPP was an anachronism that went against the prevailing neoliberal ideology of the global order at the dawn of the 21st century.²¹ It was for this reason that the PPRD opted for “social democracy” as its ideological orientation—a compromise between the more radical elements in former



President Laurent Kabila’s entourage, and those others who were wary of an openly socialist or Marxist political party. Even this distinction, however, is open to question. Another PPRD luminary suggested that many observers missed a particular nuance in Mzee Kabila’s philosophy, arguing that he was not, in fact, a Marxist, nor in favor of a centrally planned economy. According to this source, Mzee was more of a “revolutionary nationalist” than a socialist—someone who wanted to put an end to imperialism. Furthermore, he argued, the CPP was not a left-wing organization; it was simply a system for mobilizing people.²² Regardless, Laurent Kabila’s legacy and its impact on the PPRD is ambiguous at best, and his credentials as a Marxist and even a Lumumbist are difficult to ascertain.²³

had worked with Laurent Kabila and then continued with Joseph.²⁴ These categories are no longer salient in the PPRD today, but they reflect the initial tensions at the heart of the party and in attempts to bring people together into a cohesive political unit. In one account, Léonard She Okitundu²⁵ was tasked with bringing some recalcitrant members of the CPP on board with the PPRD project—people like Mwenze Kongolo, but also Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi and, likely, other members of the CPP national directorate.²⁶ When the party was finally created, it was Chikez Diemu, the former governor of Katanga and ex-AFDL member, who was chosen to be its first secretary general. He was chosen, according to one source, because he was a “Mzeeiste” (and a Katangan, like many key former AFDL figures) and who could therefore help consolidate support from the followers of Laurent Kabila who were reluctant to join the PPRD.²⁷

Factions, Coalitions, and Electoral Strategies

Although it was born in power, the PPRD had to overcome numerous obstacles since its creation in order to maintain power. One of these included reconciling the different interests and points of view of the founding members originally allied with Laurent Kabila and those who came later. Subsequently, it found itself in the difficult position of trying to maintain power through fragile coalitions of political parties.

Mzeeistes and Josephistes: Bringing Together the Old and the New

The first order of business in creating the PPRD was to bring the various individuals and factions within the ruling elite together into a cohesive unit. One of the significant cleavages among the members was between those who had been *compagnons de lutte* (comrades-in-arms) of Mzee Laurent Kabila, and those who had been brought into the fold under his son, Joseph. They were referred to, respectively, as “Mzeeistes” and “Josephistes” among party members. When asked, several sources denied truly belonging to one camp or another. For example, Mwenze Kongolo, who ended up refusing to join the PPRD, was considered to be a “Mzeeiste.” Théophile Mbeumba claimed to be neither “Mzeeiste” or “Josephiste,” although he, like many of the PPRD’s founding members,

Proportional Representation in the DRC

Following the reign of Mobutu and the *Mouvement populaire pour la révolution* (MPR), a consensus emerged among the Congolese political class and civil society—informed by outside constitutional advisors—that it would be a mistake to allow the creation of large political parties, in the interest of promoting pluralism within the political system.²⁸ As a result, perhaps, of the will to avoid domination by a single party, the electoral law adopted in 2006 opted for a proportional representation open list system for electoral districts of two or more seats, using the largest remainder formula. The 2006 electoral law states: “These modalities allow the representation of all territories and cities and of all political tendencies present in the public opinion.” However, the desire for representativeness has come at a cost: the massive increase in the number of political parties in DRC since the 2006 elections, from 278 in 2006 to 601 in 2018.²⁹

An attempt to reduce the incentive to create additional parties was adopted before the 2018 elections, with the creation of a representativeness threshold (*seuil*), allowing only those party and *regroupement politique* (political grouping) lists having obtained 1% of the total number of votes nationally to be eligible for a seat. The number of political parties has continued to grow, although the number of political entities represented in the national assembly decreased from 98 in 2011 to 32 in 2018. This apparent success in decreasing fragmentation within the parliament has been hampered by an innovation for the 2018 elections, which saw the creation of *regroupements politiques* made up of multiple smaller parties competing together on the same list in legislative elections, in order to attain the electoral threshold, or have a better chance of obtaining a seat via the highest remainder rule. As a result, fragmentation within the Congolese political landscape still remains high: following the 2018 elections, 21 of the 32 political formations represented in the national assembly were *regroupements politiques*, and obtained 293 of the 485 seats (these figures do not include the fifteen seats in the east whose elections took place in early 2019). In the latest amendments to the electoral law, adopted and promulgated in June 2022, an additional tool has been added to the threshold for representativeness. A new rule designed to limit the number of political parties and groupings has been created: an admissibility threshold (*seuil de recevabilité*) in which party and *regroupement* lists must field candidates in 60% of the country’s electoral districts in order to be eligible to participate in the electoral process.



2002-2018: Staying in Power

Since 2002, the PPRD has gone through three electoral cycles (2006, 2011, 2018) and five secretaries general.³⁰ Between 2003 and 2006, it was part of the power sharing agreement agreed to as part of the Sun City Accords. Since the first electoral cycle in 2006, the party has been engaged in two key kinds of arrangements in order to attain and maintain power. The first is the system that is often dismissively referred to as *partis-tiroirs* or *partis-mallettes* (“accessory” political parties) that are created strictly for the purpose of competing in the country’s particular kind of proportional representation voting system. These parties are collectively referred to as the *mosaïque* PPRD. The DRC uses a form of open list proportional representation using the principle of the highest remainder. In this system, an electoral quotient is established in each district with more than one seat. Voters choose one candidate (either a candidate on a party or *regroupement* list, or an independent). Once the voting is finished, the number of valid votes cast is divided by the number of seats in the district to produce the electoral quotient. Seats are then attributed to the parties or candidates having reached the electoral quotient (provided the parties have also been able to garner 1% of the legislative votes nationally).³¹ If a party or *regroupement* list in a given district has enough votes to get 2.75 seats, for example, it automatically gets 2 seats. The next seat is then given to the list or independent candidate that has met the electoral quotient. If no other list has met the electoral quotient, the next seat goes to the list with the highest remainder, meaning the next highest vote tally, and so on, until all the district’s seats have been attributed.

The logic of the accessory party system is to create artificial parties whose candidates are, for all intents and purposes, members of the PPRD, but who run on a different party list in order to recoup additional seats, thanks to the highest remainder rule. For example, in the 2018 elections in the district of Idiofa (Kwilu province), the former PPRD president of the national assembly, Aubin Minaku Ndjalandjoko, was re-elected on the PPRD list, which garnered a total of 47,449 votes, in a district with an electoral quotient of 41,668. The PPRD list therefore automatically obtained one seat, and since Minaku had the most votes on the PPRD list, it was awarded to him. In addition, Zury Masela Kiruty was elected on the list of the *Rassemblement pour la reconstruction du Congo* (RRC) *mosaïque* PPRD party with only 21,729 votes for the party list.³² By being on a separate list, Zury Masela Kiruty, who was also elected in 2011, arguably attracted more votes than if he had been on the PPRD list, under the shadow of Aubin

Minaku. Thus, thanks to the highest remainder rule, the PPRD was able to secure two seats, while other FCC parties secured an additional three seats (AAB, AA/a, ADRP), giving Joseph Kabila’s FCC five of the district’s seven seats in total.

Even PPRD luminaries are sometimes elected on the party lists of the *mosaïque*. In the same 2018 legislative elections, former party secretary general Henri Mova Sakanyi was elected in the Kinshasa I district of Lukunga on the list of the *Parti du peuple pour la paix et la démocratie* (PPPD) with 11,738 votes for the party list, while his PPRD colleague, Willy Pelenda Makengo, was voted into office with a score of 9,618 votes on the party list—both were able to gain their seats via the highest remainder rule; their district’s electoral quotient was 26,412. An additional six parliamentarians (*députés*) were elected on lists for other members of Kabila’s FCC, bringing its total to eight of the district’s sixteen available seats.³³ In this district, only one of the sixteen elected representatives obtained more votes than the electoral quotient—all the others were elected via the highest remainder rule, which testifies to the extent of fragmentation in the vote due to the number of party and *regroupement politique* lists. One PPRD member explained that this scenario was the reason for adopting the strategy of creating the *mosaïque* parties: there would, it felt, be a greater chance in obtaining more seats with the highest remainder rule via multiple lists rather than grouping all the PPRD candidates on the same list, even if it meant that none of those lists met the electoral quotient.³⁴

The second strategy it has employed has been the creation of large, multiparty coalitions anchored around the Kabila presidency, with the PPRD as their largest member and incorporating all the members of their *mosaïque* in addition to other Kabila-aligned parties. In 2006, the *Alliance pour la majorité présidentielle* (AMP) was thus created to support Joseph Kabila’s candidacy in the 2006 elections. It then created an alliance with the *Parti lumumbiste unifié* (PALU) and the *Union de démocrates mobutistes* (UDEMO), which respectively represented blocs of voters mostly in the former Bandundu and Équateur provinces. In 2011, the AMP was dissolved in favor of a different coalition, the *Majorité présidentielle* (MP). The FCC became the latest of these coalitions to see the light of day, which supported the campaign of Kabila’s chosen successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, in the 2018 elections.

One source described the strategy of the *mosaïque* parties and the Kabila-centered coalitions thus: the *mosaïque*, he said, exists for elections; the coalitions exist for governing.³⁵ The *mosaïque* was a strategy developed only in 2011, following the analysis of the 2006 results, as




an attempt to increase its own electoral score and try to maintain its influence within the presidential coalitions. Regardless of how successful it was, it was also illegal, according to one young PPRD leader, since some PPRD members were also technically members of the accessory parties.³⁶ How did this dual strategy—of accessory parties and presidential coalitions—work over time?

In 2006, the PPRD won 111 seats in the National Assembly—a plurality of the 500 seats up for grabs, while the AMP won 290 seats, giving the coalition a majority. In 2011, in elections that were highly criticized, the party won only 62 seats—still a plurality—while the *mosaïque*, now competing for the first time, won 53 seats and the presidential coalition (MP) won 340 seats. The party again lost ground in 2018, winning 51 seats, although still a plurality in the increasingly fragmented national assembly, while the *mosaïque* picked up 67 seats collectively, making 118 seats for the PPRD and its *mosaïque* out of the FCC’s 341 seats total. What do these figures tell us about the PPRD’s influence within the broader landscape of political parties surrounding Joseph Kabila?

One of the PPRD’s slogans that was ubiquitous on t-shirts and other party propaganda was “on gagne et on gagne” (we keep [on] winning). When examined closely, however, the *mosaïque* parties seem to have been a strategy to buttress losses. The strategy of splitting PPRD candidates across different party lists in the hope of gaining additional seats has had mixed results (see Table below). In 2006, before the *mosaïque* was created, we see the PPRD

with 111 of the national assembly’s 500 seats. In 2011, this number dropped to 62. Therefore, it appears that the strategy of the *mosaïque* simply allowed the PPRD to only slightly increase its total number of seats both in general and as a share of the presidential coalition. Other factors certainly also played a role, especially Kabila’s declining popularity. In sum, this strategy may have allowed the PPRD to only marginally increase its number of elected representatives: from 111 seats (of the presidential coalition’s 290 seats) in 2006 without the *mosaïque*, it obtained 115 (including the *mosaïque* seats) in 2011 (of the presidential coalition’s 340 seats), and 118 (including the *mosaïque* seats) in 2018 (of the presidential coalition’s 341 seats), while losing a degree of centralized control over its coalition members.

What is clear, regardless, is that the creation of accessory parties contributed to increasing the number of political parties in the DRC—a phenomenon driven in part by the specific type of proportional representation electoral system in place. As of 2018, there were 601 political parties registered in the DRC and 77 *regroupements politiques* representing 395 of the 601 registered parties. Following the 2018 elections (not including the elections held in early 2019 in parts of the east), eleven parties and 21 *regroupements politiques* obtained seats in the national assembly. These 21 *regroupements politiques* were elected with lists totaling 196 political parties. The eleven party lists garnered 192 seats, while the 21 *regroupements* obtained 293 seats.³⁷



PPRD, Mosaïque, and Presidential Coalition Seats (2006-2018)³⁸

	Electoral Cycle	2006	2011	2018
1	PPRD legislative seats	111	62	51
2	PPRD % of legislature	22.2%	12.4%	10.4%
3	<i>Mosaïque</i> PPRD legislative seats	N/A	53	67
4	Combined PPRD and <i>mosaïque</i> seats	N/A	115	118
5	Presidential coalition seats (AMP, MP, FCC)	290 ³⁹	340	341
6	<i>Mosaïque</i> PPRD % of national assembly	N/A	10.6%	13.4%
7	PPRD and <i>mosaïque</i> % of presidential coalition seats	38.27%	33.8%	34.6%
8	PPRD and <i>mosaïque</i> % of national assembly	22.2% ⁴⁰	23%	23.6%



Centralization and Fragmentation in Congolese Politics

The tendency to oscillate between fragmentation and centralization in Congolese politics began in the late 1950s, as ethnic and cultural associations were transformed into political parties. In 1960, the 137 seats up for grabs in the May elections for the chamber of deputies were split between over 25 parties grouped into alliances—a clear absence of a majority for any single party. Patrice Lumumba's *Mouvement national congolais* (MNC-Lumumba) took a plurality of seats (33), while his alliance, the *MNC-Lumumba et alliés* took only 41 seats total. Some of this fragmentation was the result of early cleavages based on region and ethnicity. Many of the parties that contested the 1960 elections had grown out of the ethno-cultural associations that had become the vehicles for expressing grievances and then political parties contesting elections beginning in 1957.⁴¹ These were parties like the *Association des Bakongo* (ABAKO), the *Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT), and the *Association générale des Baluba du Katanga* (BALUBAKAT), among others. Even Lumumba's MNC represented the main ethnic groups in Kinshasa (from Équateur and Province Orientale).⁴²

After the secession of Katanga and South Kasai in the early 1960s, President Mobutu, citing politicians' "ruin" of the country, banned political parties in November 1965 for five years.⁴³ In 1967, he created the country's single party (*parti unique*)—the *Mouvement populaire pour la révolution* (MPR). This was created as a vehicle to consolidate his power, in part by eliminating other political parties. The MPR's founding document, the *Manifeste de la N'sele*, describes the political situation after independence as one in which political parties "...were, in reality, nothing but groups without order nor a program, without an overall view or national consciousness, [that] did not care about the good of the state, [were] solely brought together on the basis of tribe, and [were] animated by often sordid personal ambitions."⁴⁴ The justification for the MPR as a single "movement" followed a logic that was occurring elsewhere in Africa with the creation of single parties around the same time, such as in Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania. These and other, similar later movements formally eschewed party labels. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, for example, in his 1997 autobiography, described political parties in that country as sectarian, opportunistic, and ethnically based when justifying the creation of the National Resistance Movement.⁴⁵ A decade or so following Museveni in Uganda, in 1999, Laurent Kabila's *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo* (AFDL) gave way to the *Comités du pouvoir populaire* (CPP). Like the MPR, the CPP was hostile to, and excluded the existence of, other political parties and similar political organizations. At least officially, Mobutu saw the MPR as a necessary condition for creating peace and unity in the country following the fractious years following independence.⁴⁶ Laurent-Désiré Kabila, as described above, was equally skeptical of political parties. Since 2003, however, the pendulum has swung back, with the steady increase in the number of political parties and the resulting necessity of governing with large political coalitions.

The *Initiateur* and the *Caciques*: Joseph Kabila and His Court

When one begins researching the PPRD, the first thing that becomes apparent is that in writings on politics in the DRC, discussions of Joseph Kabila far outnumber those about his party.⁴⁷ Even in academic political histories of the Congo, there are few mentions of the PPRD.⁴⁸ This lack of importance given to the party reflects the extent of the personalization of Joseph Kabila's power (like that of Mobutu). The PPRD in most cases is an afterthought to discussions about Kabila's power. One former party cadre and national minister said as much to CRG and Ebuteli, arguing that to understand Congolese politics following 2001, it would be more instructive to examine the circles of power that surrounded Joseph Kabila than the PPRD.⁴⁹

This focus on Kabila is reflected in the indirect references to him in party statutes: as the *Initiateur* in the 2002, 2006, and 2011 statutes and, in 2018, as the national president. Yet Joseph Kabila has never run as the PPRD candidate in any presidential election. He has always chosen to stand as an independent, despite being the central figure of both a political party and a large multiparty coalition.

As described above, Joseph Kabila was surrounded, while in office, by individuals and groups of people who were competing for influence over him—as head of state and the most powerful person in the country. Some—indeed, many—of these people were members of the PPRD, the so-called *caciques* (bigwigs): Aubin Minaku, Évariste Boshab, Adolphe Lumanu, Léonard She Okitundu, Augustin Katumba Mwanke, Vital Kamerhe. Others were Kabila allies who were members of the presidential political coalitions—people like Raymond Tshibanda, Lambert Mende, and Pierre Lumbi. As with other leaders, over time, certain individuals who were part of Kabila's inner circle fell out of favor and were replaced by others, who then fell out favor themselves. Sometimes, those who have fallen out have returned. Those who have remained throughout are rare.

Professor Théophile Mbemba is a good example of this phenomenon. He served in multiple key posts under both Laurent and Joseph Kabila: governor of Kinshasa (1997-2001), chief of staff to President Joseph Kabila (2001) and minister of the interior (2001-2006). Following the 2006 elections, he became an ordinary parliamentarian (*député*), before returning briefly to government with a ministerial portfolio between 2014 and 2016 as minister

of higher education. Yet in the controversial elections of 2018, this founding member of the PPRD and former cabinet minister was unable even to secure a seat—allegedly, according to him, because Aubin Minaku and André Kimbuta, two important PPRD politicians from the former province of Bandundu, had conspired against him to rig the results in his legislative district of Kenge (Kwilu).⁵⁰ In December 2022, he left the PPRD altogether and founded his own party.⁵¹ It is surprising that a former chief of staff to Joseph Kabila and founding member of the PPRD would go so far as to leave the party and found a new one. But this represents what one might describe as the natural conclusion of his gradual fall from the upper echelons of power—those surrounding Joseph Kabila himself, and within the PPRD. Another case is that of Léonard She Okitundu: he served as foreign minister under both Laurent and Joseph Kabila between 2000 and 2004. Following that, he was an itinerant ambassador for the presidency (2004-2005) and chief of staff to the president (2005-2007). After this period, he remained simply a senator (following the 2006 elections) until he was again named to his previous post of minister of foreign affairs in 2016. She Okitundu's case is one in which someone who appeared to have fallen out of favor with Kabila returned.

Kabila's shadow continues to loom large over the party. He is the final arbiter of all major decisions regarding appointments, while party cadres create and maintain spheres of influence. The latter includes so-called “barons” who, from Kinshasa, exert influence over their respective provinces of origin. When the PPRD was in power, they influenced both internal party appointments at the level of the provinces, and appointments within the state apparatus in their home provinces. Often, these barons engaged in political competition among one another, leading to so-called “leadership wars” (*guerres de leadership*).⁵² In the midst of this dominance by elites, the base has virtually no ability to influence major party decisions or strategy, let alone select the party's legislative and presidential candidates.

More importantly, the party is simply indissociable from Kabila. And therefore, the PPRD currently finds itself in a bind now that it is no longer in power. Kabila's style of practicing politics by insisting on remaining above the fray, conveying an aura of quiet reflection and power, was previously an asset.⁵³ Now, however, it has become a vulnerability. His lack of investment in the PPRD has undermined it. He is not a “rally the crowd” type of politician, and does not appear to be particularly interested in substantial reforms—at least not at the pace that most of his followers would like, although these reforms—via a party congress—have been long promised. The party now faces fundamental existential questions. Will Kabila seek to remain an important



player in Congolese politics? Will the party remain intact?

There are signs that the party is unraveling. Particularly since the FCC-CACH coalition was dissolved, and the PPRD lost power. Several major figures have formally or informally left: Évariste Boshab, Léonard She Okitundu, and Adolphe Lumanu are no longer active in the party, although they have not formally announced their departure. Didi Manara is among the 36 PPRD and *mosaïque* parliamentarians who have left the party, while Théophile Mbemba, one of the PPRD founding members, has left to create his own party (see above).

Party Structures and Operations: Ideology, Accountability

“The party hardly exists anymore. In the provinces, party offices have closed. The *structures d’appui au parti* [party support structures] are no longer functioning.”⁵⁴ This diagnosis of the PPRD, by a youth member in June 2021, is telling for what it says about the party’s current state, but also about how informal party structures exist. Despite repeated requests, CRG and Ebuteli were not able to obtain an organizational chart (*organigramme*) of the party, which is indicative of these structural weaknesses.

One of the places where the informal governing of the party—and by extension, the country, when Joseph Kabila was in power—becomes evident is in what several interlocutors called either the “G15” (Group of 15) or the “Groupe de Kingakati”—a reference to the farm outside Kinshasa where Kabila often holds political meetings. The G15 allegedly used to hold one to two meetings per month on average, after which major party decisions would be taken.⁵⁵ This group, led by the party secretary general, is “now in hibernation,” according to a party leader.⁵⁶ People said to have been part of the G15 over the years include: Aubin Minaku, Évariste Boshab, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, Jean Mbuyu, Adolphe Lumanu, Barnabe Kikayi bin Karubi, and Henri Mova Sakanyi, among others. However, not everyone agrees that it is or was the key decision making organ within the party.⁵⁷ No other structure that could link Kabila or other informal power brokers to the PPRD has replaced the G15, leaving decision-making in the hands of both the official structures and, more importantly, those party members who have retained influence over Kabila. The party structures are sometimes thrown off balance when Kabila decides to intervene (see below).

Ideology

The official ideology of the PPRD is social democracy. In practice, however, their ideology is mostly devoid of substance and is certainly not a focus of party leadership or members. This, despite early attempts by some within the party leadership to outline the substance of the party’s values and commitment, and despite their enshrinement within the party statutes. For example, in June 2006, a colloquium on social democracy was held in Kinshasa.⁵⁸ Notably, this colloquium, although it included numerous PPRD members as speakers, was held under the auspices of the presidency of the republic, rather than the party—demonstrating the conflation between the party and the state or, in this instance, between party ideology and what might be termed official state ideology.

Further evidence of the intellectual attempts to ground the party’s ideology can be found in another text, co-authored by Léonard She Okitundu and Freddy Albert Mukoyi and published in 2006 with a preface by Joseph Kabila, entitled *La social-démocratie: Outil de la refondation de la République et de la citoyenneté*.⁵⁹ This volume, of approximately 150 pages, offers a lengthy theoretical overview of the concept of social democracy, but does not discuss its applications for Congolese society. As a result, while it is a laudable contribution, it does not appear to have been useful even as a blueprint for the party with regard to a political platform.

As one former party cadre described it, whenever the session about ideology emerged in party congresses and meetings, everyone would leave the room—they were not interested. “Ideology,” he said, “is the poor relative (*le parent pauvre*) of the PPRD.”⁶⁰ The apparent lack of interest by party members, as well as the absence of extensive party platforms describing the relationship between ideology and policy, make clear that party ideology is not a major priority for the PPRD. Instead, it is assumed that all policies enacted by the PPRD can be somehow interpreted as constituting “social democracy.” It is difficult to evaluate the relationship between the PPRD’s governance and its ideology. The national budget has historically been relatively small, so most funds under the PPRD went to recurring expenses and salaries. But most of the reforms undertaken by Joseph Kabila and the PPRD would qualify as liberal: allowing the creation of political parties, the privatization of parastatals, opening the country up to massive foreign capital investments—all the while trying to make sure that this liberalization does not threaten their grip on power.

Accountability

Accountability in liberal democracies is typically understood as a system in which elected officials are held (and hold themselves) responsible for their conduct and the outcomes of their policies. Often, accountability takes the form of a sanction: for example, if a minister is involved in a political scandal, or if the ministry under his or her responsibility is seen to have caused harm to the public, he or she is removed from their position. We can also speak of accountability within organizations, by asking how, whether, and to whom an organization's leadership is accountable.

The PPRD, like all political parties and organizations, is a mixture of formal and informal structures and loci of power and decision making. Rather than begin by measuring it according to conventional normative yardsticks of political accountability, such as whether and how party leaders are sanctioned according to statutes and by-laws, it is worth using a case study of a recent set of internal conflicts to learn what they can tell us about how accountability does and does not work in practice in the PPRD.

On January 31, 2021, the president of the PPRD's youth league, Serge Kadima Luabeya, was suspended from his position following a dispute with the *secrétaire permanent* (SP), Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.⁶¹ The suspension was officially justified as a disciplinary action for having obstructed a decision of the SP.

But the events that followed publicly exposed a faultline that had been growing within the party at least since the 2018 election. Many members, and particularly party youth, were upset with the old guard of party leaders, and in particular, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary's continued leadership despite having lost the 2018 presidential election.

A new youth movement came into public view following Kadima Luabeya's suspension. Led by Jimmy Ngalasi, the *Force révolutionnaire du changement* (FRC, Revolutionary Force of Change) began to publicly protest Shadary's leadership. The FRC's public actions began with strong denunciations of Shadary himself, stating that he was the driving force behind the PPRD's numerous failures.⁶² However, Ngalasi did not shy away from also criticizing the rest of the party leadership, albeit not by name: "We consider that the PPRD [that they are demanding be restructured] means all the current PPRD leaders."⁶³ Crucially, however, Ngalasi's protest movement did not question the overall leadership of the *Président national* (PN), Joseph Kabila.

The second example relates to a recent series of nominations made within party structures by the SP, Shadary. On April 29, 2022, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary appointed several new people to the party structures. However, on May 16, 2022, a hasty announcement was made that annulled these appointments, stating: "The latest nominations [*mises en place*] by the permanent secretariat are adjourned in order to harmonize different points of view within the party."⁶⁴ The subtlety of the press release was not lost on one source, a member of the *bureau politique*: Joseph Kabila, the PN, had revoked the decisions of his SP.⁶⁵

The power of the party head to change these kinds of decisions *ex post facto* was explained to CRG/Ebuteli in the following way by one formerly high-placed member:

"As a general rule, it is difficult in sub-Saharan Africa for decisions to be taken by party structures...There are always parallel structures that cannibalize [*phagocytent*] official structures in decision making. The PPRD has not escaped this rule. The explanation for this phenomenon is that political parties are mixed up [*confondus*] with their founders, who behave as 'owners,' [thereby] leaving official structures very little room for maneuver. This creates many frustrations, because the official structures have to account to party activists while in reality, they only have nominal, rather than actual, power."⁶⁶

The party founder therefore becomes the final arbiter of all decisions, which he or she can revoke at will: "Accountability and loyalty are [directed] toward the creator of the party. Anyone can spit on the party structures and claim that their loyalty to the leader is enough. This is justified by the fact that remuneration after the elections does not depend on the [electoral] score or on the proposals that would come from the statutory bodies, but on parallel structures [that respond to] other criteria."⁶⁷

This rare moment of honesty by an important PPRD insider is telling. It reflects a set of underlying assumptions often left unsaid in public discourse about the PPRD and other Congolese political parties: major decisions must be approved by the party leader; decisions not approved by the party leader may be revoked at any time; and formal party structures are subject to informal power groups whose influence ultimately trumps them. The party base is therefore called to express itself within formal party structures, but it is rarely taken into account.

The *de facto* result in this configuration is that the ultimate accountability is to the party leader, in this case Joseph Kabila, who almost never communicates in public regarding PPRD matters. This pattern was recently bro-



ken when Kabila presided over a meeting of the *bureau politique*—the first time he had done so, according to one source.⁶⁸ Other decisions follow a similar pattern at lower levels, based on which superior was able to procure you a post. As one party member noted: “Accountability is found in the relationship that you have with the person who named you.”⁶⁹

The underlying logic here is thus one in which accountability flows upwards, toward party leaders, rather than downwards toward the party base. This system does not indicate an absence of accountability per se, but one that is inverted when compared to liberal democratic norms: the party leadership is not accountable to the base, but the base (or at least, those who have been named to key posts) is accountable to it. Accountability may exist, but it is not democratic. As a result, many members of the base are frustrated with party leadership, but are apparently unable to change the existing system of upward accountability. At the same time, these members of the party base are not simply interested in accountability per se, but in the ways in which the party distributed government posts to family members of party leaders rather than to activists who have struggled to promote the party.⁷⁰

Conclusion

The history of political parties in the DRC after independence has been marked by an oscillation between two systems of political competition. On the one hand, there has been a push, at certain moments, for political pluralism. At other moments, there has been a pull in the opposite direction, toward centralization and the banning of political parties (see text box above). This dynamic—and its effects—has deeply marked the Congolese political landscape.⁷¹ This report argues that the PPRD has been part of this oscillation and subject to its vicissitudes. More specifically, it has used and been bedeviled by the tendency toward fragmentation, which, since 2006, has increased due in part to the type of proportional representation voting system the DRC uses. Like the UDPS today, the PPRD created relatively fragile coalitions and alliances to maintain power. In the current system it is impossible for any single party to govern alone.⁷² AMP, MP, and the FCC coalitions anchored by the PPRD have all been a “necessary evil” for the party: required for maintaining the party in power, while also diluting and weakening that power, and fundamentally rendering political governance unstable.

The PPRD has therefore never truly been able to imitate the other big-tent liberation parties in southern Africa after which it sought to model itself: the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA).⁷³ It was created within a political system that has precluded the emergence of large parties. Moreover, the only glue currently holding the PPRD together is, like most Congolese political parties, its leader, his personality, and the aura surrounding him—a striking difference compared to the liberation parties in southern Africa that have a history of shared struggle against minority rule and strong party structures which has allowed them to transcend individual leaders. The upper echelons of the PPRD leadership are fundamentally accountable only to Joseph Kabila, who must approve all important decisions, while provincial leadership is typically accountable only to formal and informal national leaders.

Today, the party members who have remained loyal are awaiting long promised decisions about restructuring. For many, the current SP, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, must be replaced. He is seen for some as being responsible for losing the presidency. Others, however, stress that Shadary’s replacement, while inevitable, will not solve the party’s problems. For them, greater structural change is needed in order to adapt and become a true opposition party, ready to contest and win competitive elections in 2023.

This is the context in which the PPRD marked its 20th anniversary on March 31, 2022. Although Ramazany Shadary had hoped to hold a large party, his plans were cut short when Joseph Kabila announced that they would hold a meeting of the political office (*bureau politique*) that day at his Kinshasa property.⁷⁴ The meeting was led by Joseph Kabila himself—the first time he had ever done so since the founding of the party in 2002.⁷⁵ At that time, it was announced that a party congress would be held in May 2022, where decisions would be taken about the party’s future, including its restructuring. But this congress, which has been postponed several times, had not yet taken place at the time of publication. Several party cadres and activists with whom CRG and Ebuteli spoke complained that the process for renewing the party was taking too long. With elections on the horizon, it is therefore unclear whether the PPRD will remain viable, especially if Joseph Kabila continues his slow retreat from politics.



Recommendations

Political parties are critical to the health of a democracy. They are the main conduit for representation between the electorate and government. The lack of admissibility (*recevabilité*) within parties has hampered the ability of the population to hold their leader responsible. They have voted their legislators, governors, and now even the president out of office, but this turnover has not been able to staunch corruption or counter the rampant impunity that characterizes the Congolese state.

Three areas of reform should be considered to improve the performance of political parties: a change in the electoral law to reduce the number of parties; the implementation of finance laws to prevent parties from becoming beholden to unaccountable elites; the articulation of clear and realistic policy programs by political actors; and better institutions within political parties to make them more accountable to their constituencies.

Change in the electoral law: As our reports suggest, the sheer number of political parties represented in government and parliament make it difficult to hold the government to account and to develop clear policy platforms. Many political leaders recognize that this fragmentation is a problem, but many also benefit from this system. In July 2021, the government promulgated a new electoral law that introduces the requirement to run candidates in at least 60% of electoral districts, on top of the requirement that each list or independent candidate must reach a threshold to be eligible for the allocation of seats—the *seuil électoral* (1% of seats for legislative, 3% for provincial, and 10% for local elections). In theory, these reforms should reduce the number of political parties. However, as in previous elections, the persistence of *regroupements politiques*, essentially with electoral goals, will not achieve the desired result. Legislators should consider an amendment to the electoral law to make these requirements apply to parties and not *regroupements*.

Financing of political parties: Having a few large parties that are controlled by a few wealthy individuals or corporations would not solve the problems the current system faces. Indeed, currently political parties that try to field candidates in 60% of all electoral districts would have to pay large sums in registration fees alone. If there are other provisions, such as those mentioned above, then those fees should be reduced or eliminated. On June 10, 2008 parliament passed the law 008/005 on the public financing of elections. This law provides for significant government funding of political parties, proportional to their representation in the various legislative bodies in

the country. In return, parties would have to open their accounts for inspection, which could help promote accountability. However, this law has never been implemented, and parts of the text are vague—the sums could potentially be very high and it is unclear how they would be distributed. Legislators should amend this law and make sure it is enforced.

The articulation of realistic and detailed policy platforms: Public debates over policy are necessary for a healthy democracy—they help hold leaders accountable once elected and they forge grassroots coalitions around core interests. There is currently very little public debate in the Congo over, for example, tax rates, army reform, an international tribunal for war crimes, or agricultural policy. Most major policy decisions are made without much public debate, as was the case for joining the East African Community, the legislative ordinance (*ordonnance-loi*) on military planning, or the creation of a value added tax in 2012. While parties such as PPRD and UDPS have official ideologies, it is often difficult to see any ideological difference between them, and policy proposals often boil down to broad slogans such as “good governance” and “peace and stability.” Political parties should develop nuanced and realistic policy platforms—ahead of the 2018 elections some candidates put forward utopian projections of revenue collection, for example—ahead of the next elections, and media and civil society organizations should promote this kind of dialogue by asking pointed questions and putting forward proposals themselves.

Investing in strong, accountable party structures: As our reports document, Congolese political parties have few internal accountability mechanisms. They are highly personalized; officials derive their status and power through their loyalty towards the main leaders. Statutory meetings are held irregularly, the agendas are set by a few individuals, and transcripts are not made available. Meanwhile, funds are managed opaquely with few if any audits, and little transparency regarding the source of funding. There are no easy fixes to this problem. Allowing the ministry of interior to police parties could lead to abuses reminiscent of the authoritarian past, and the Congo does not have a good experience in creating non-partisan national commissions—the CENI or the *Commission nationale des droits de l’homme* (CNDH) are examples of these pitfalls. Something, however, needs to be done. Following the next elections, the ministry of interior or CENI should convene a forum of political parties to discuss how best to monitor and implement this kind of accountability.



Annex I - PPRD Statutes Preamble (2002)⁷⁶

We, the Members of the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy, committed to the republican values of freedom, justice, peace and progress; Moved by the common ideal of ensuring for the Democratic Republic of Congo sustainable development and to free it from any kind of servitude;

Drawing lessons from the political history of our country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, characterized essentially by:

- the coveting of the immense national territory and its natural resources bequeathed to us by our ancestors;
- the enslavement of our people in all its forms for decades;
- the betrayal of the Motherland by some sons of the Congo;

Strengthened by the liberation of the Congolese people by the revolution of May 17, 1997 lifted up massively by the Congolese people;

Imbued with the patriotic bravery marked by the supreme sacrifices of the fathers of independence and national heroes;

Aware of our collective destiny and the role of political organizations in the conduct of a society and the building of the rule of law through a democratic process;

Desiring to peacefully build in and to actively and usefully participate in the rebirth of the Congolese people in a new Congo, more beautiful than before, strong and prosperous in the heart of Africa;

Convinced of the imperious and absolute necessity to gather the daughters and sons of the Congo around a clearly defined ideology and doctrine, a political vision of the organization and exercise of power, a plan for economic, social, and cultural development, and a justice system that guarantees individual and collective freedoms, and a defense and security system that is commensurate with the geostrategic position of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the full development of its people;

Affirming our respect for the principles and our adherence to the objectives set forth in Law No. 001/2001 of May 17, 2001 on the organization and functioning of political parties and political parties and groupings;

Conscious of our responsibility to God, the ancestors the Congolese people and humanity;

We solemnly adopt the current statutes of the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy, "PPRD" in acronym.

Annex II - Legislative Election Results, Idiofa District, Kwilu Province, 2018 (as of January 11, 2019)



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
COMMISSION ELECTORALE NATIONALE INDEPENDANTE
C.E.N.I.



ELECTION DES DEPUTES NATIONAUX DE 2018

RESULTATS PROVISOIRES

FICHE D'ATTRIBUTION DES SIEGES AUX CANDIDATS DES LISTES

PROVINCE:	KWILU	CIRCONSCRIPTION ELECTORALE	IDIOFA
-----------	-------	----------------------------	--------

Nombre total d'électeurs inscrits:	513 296	Suffrages valablement exprimés:	316 054
Nombre total de votants:	317 032	Suffrages valablement exprimés pour listes seuil:	291 674
Taux de participation:	61,76 %	Quotient électoral pour listes seuil:	41 668
Bulletins blancs:	978		

NOM, POST-NOM ET PRENOM DES CANDIDATS	AGE	SIGLE DE LA LISTE	VOIX LISTE	SIEGES LISTE	VOIX CANDIDAT	MENTION
NDAMBU WOLANG RICHARD	66	AAB	27 963	1	25 173	ELU
YAMA NZALABAR JOLIE	49	AA/a	29 675	1	20 730	ELU
MUPASA LUKOBO DHEDHE	53	ADRP	16 871	1	14 871	ELU
MBUKU LAKA BORIS	54	G7	23 170	1	21 316	ELU
MUZAZA OWAN NGAMPIO THIERRY	50	PALU & ALLIES	17 081	1	5 561	ELU
MINAKU NDJALANDJOKO AUBIN	54	PPRD	47 449	1	40 701	ELU
MASELA KILUTY ZURY	63	RRC	21 729	1	19 189	ELU
KAKULA NGONDA JACQUES	53	RASSOP	367	0	76	
MUDIMU HIDANE EDDY	63	ACC	12 325	0	476	
SESEK MFUR-A-MVUR NKUM DONATIEN	60	AAAC	8 757	0	3 541	
NSOMA MPWEYEP RODIN	54	AAAC	8 757	0	195	
PIPETE KASIAMA ARSENE	62	AA/a	29 675	1	120	
KURUR-KURU KAWANGA PASCAL-MICHELIN	48	ADU	1 198	0	99	
MUKIEME KAMBALA FISTON	31	ABCE	11 098	0	19	
BISIMU ALINGATE APOLLINAIRE	47	AMK	737	0	546	
MABAKA LABWA ADOLIN	50	RRC	21 729	1	140	
MULENDA MBULUMUNA FLAVIEN	52	AAB	27 963	1	262	
KINZONGO ANKURA DIDIER	45	ADU	1 198	0	13	
ONDAIN ANSOOMBWANG BAZOL ROGATIEN	67	AAAC	8 757	0	333	
MAKANSANGA KIMBOL BIENVENU	44	UNC	4 171	0	15	
MASANKEN ANKOM FIFI	39	AR	9 063	0	37	
MBWENGELE HONVA JEAN BATISTE	60	AAB	27 963	1	88	

11/01/2019

Kwilu / IDIOFA

Page 396 sur 707



Annex III - Legislative Election Results, Kinshasa I District (Lukunga), Kinshasa Province, 2018 (as of January 11, 2019)



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
COMMISSION ELECTORALE NATIONALE INDEPENDANTE
C.E.N.I.



ELECTION DES DEPUTES NATIONAUX DE 2018

RESULTATS PROVISOIRES

FICHE D'ATTRIBUTION DES SIEGES AUX CANDIDATS DES LISTES

PROVINCE:	KINSHASA	CIRCONSCRIPTION ELECTORALE	KINSHASA I LUKUNGA
-----------	----------	----------------------------	--------------------

Nombre total d'électeurs inscrits:	1 110 647	Suffrages valablement exprimés:	696 969
Nombre total de votants:	710 752	Suffrages valablement exprimés pour listes seuil:	369 765
Taux de participation:	63,99 %	Quotient électoral pour listes seuil:	26 412
Bulletins blancs:	13 783		

NOM, POST-NOM ET PRENOM DES CANDIDATS	AGE	SIGLE DE LA LISTE	VOIX LISTE	SIEGES LISTE	VOIX CANDIDAT	MENTION
MAMBA KABAMBA JEAN JACQUES	43	MLC	17 442	1	9 940	ELU
MWABA KAZADI TONY	39	UDPS/TSHISEKEDI	32 135	1	7 068	ELU
PELENDIA MAKENGO WILLY	49	PPRD	9 618	1	3 834	ELU
MOVA SAKANYI HENRI	56	PPPD	11 738	1	9 315	ELU
MBEMBA KABUYA SAMUEL	44	ABCE	9 438	1	2 755	ELU
KATASI KIALA KENNEDY	32	AABC	12 246	1	1 726	ELU
FAYULU MADIDI MARTIN	62	DO	23 296	1	14 074	ELU
OKENDE SENG A CHERUBIN	57	AMK	46 787	2	3 766	ELU
NTAMBWE MPOSHI CHARMANT ELIEZER	46	AMK	46 787	2	34 289	ELU
KAYUMBA SHIKILWE BERNARD	37	AAAC	19 860	1	5 165	ELU
FEZA MOTEMA CHRISTINE	39	AA/a	24 424	1	4 081	ELU
MASUMBUKO NYENYEZI SOLANGE	43	AFDC-A	9 887	1	2 557	ELU
LIYOTA NDJOLI BIENVENU	46	AAB	24 234	1	6 180	ELU
SAKOMBI MOLENDI MOLENDI	46	UNC	14 380	1	2 264	ELU
MATULU MWANA KIPONGA CHRISTOPHE	56	FDS	1 248	0	70	
ONYUMBE YEMA AARON	55	FDS	1 248	0	59	
IWAYI M'NONGO PYTCHOU	38	RASSOP	3 993	0	812	
NKWAHATA MASANGATA LE PRINCE	43	RASSOP	3 993	0	533	
MAKASI ANANANGAZ SANDRA	37	RASSOP	3 993	0	272	
SIMBA KABANZI JULIEN	64	RASSOP	3 993	0	111	
FEZA LUFUNGULA MANDIANGU JACQUELINE	36	RASSOP	3 993	0	128	
MUSEKI TSANGA LILIANE	40	RASSOP	3 993	0	52	

11/01/2019

Kinshasa / KINSHASA I LUKUNGA

Page 216 sur 707



Endnotes

1. For reasons of confidentiality requested by interviewees, nearly all the interviews quoted here are anonymous.
2. Research for this report was conducted in 2021 and 2022, after the creation of the *Union sacrée de la nation* (USN) by Félix Tshisekedi, and after USN assumed control of the government, national parliament, and the majority of the provincial governorships and assemblies.
3. For a chronology and description of elections in DRC between 1957 and 2011, see Pamphile Mabilia Mantuba-Ngoma, *Les élections dans l'histoire politique de la République démocratique du Congo (1957-2011)* (Kinshasa: Publications Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013); accessed October 18, 2022, https://www.kas.de/documents/275840/5293160/KAS_Les+%C3%A9lections+dans+l%27histoire+politique+de+la+RDC+1957-2011.pdf/1090662f-ac51-4d1c-ebc3-81f6af3be17a?t=1568495025033.
4. Telephone interview with PPRD cadre, July 25, 2021. Another former PPRD leader, interviewed in Kinshasa on March 9, 2022, alleged that this change actually occurred after the party's creation, although the 2002 statutes suggest otherwise.
5. Interview, former PPRD cadre, July 8, 2021.
6. In this report, we use the names Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Laurent Kabila, and Mzee Kabila interchangeably.
7. "AFDL Dissolved," IRIN News (April 21, 1999); accessed October 18, 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/6184/drc-adfl-dissolved>.
8. Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, *De l'édification du pouvoir populaire en République démocratique du Congo* (Kinshasa: Secrétariat Général des CPP. Departement de l'Organisation Politique et Idéologique, 2020).
9. Interview, former PPRD cadre, Kinshasa, June 23, 2021.
10. A former PPRD cadre, interviewed in Kinshasa, July 14, 2021, stated that the CPP was a "party of the masses" created by Laurent Kabila to avoid political dissidence.
11. Interview, former PPRD cadre, Kinshasa, March 9, 2022 (A27). The idea that Laurent-Désiré Kabila wanted to make the CPP a single political party is contested, however, by the former PPRD Secretary General, Henri Mova. He argues that Kabila never intended for the CPP to replace political parties, and that it was simply "misinterpreted." See Henri Mova Sakanyi, Yvon Ramazani and Omer Nsongo, *De L.-D. Kabila à J. Kabila: La vérité des faits !*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008), 23-25. Moreover, in his speech of April 21, 1999, Laurent-Désiré Kabila stated clearly that "[t]he CPP is not a political party. I said that it is the people, organized and structured, it is a big gathering of all conscious Congolese patriots, pursuing a single goal: to be the indisputable masters of their destiny," Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, *op.cit.*, p.125.
12. Law 001/2001 of 18 May 2001 on the organization and functioning of political parties and groupings.
13. Telephone interview, former advisor to Joseph Kabila, July 25, 2021.
14. Telephone interview, Congolese political analyst, July 12, 2021 (A10)
15. Electronic communication, Théophile Mbemba, August 10, 2022. The rest of this paragraph draws on this interview.
16. Professor Évariste Boshab Mabudj-ma-Bilenge served in the following posts under Joseph Kabila: president of the national assembly, secretary general of the PPRD, minister of the interior.
17. Telephone interview, Congolese political analyst, July 12, 2021; interview, PPRD youth league member, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021. (A16)
18. *Mzee* is a Swahili honorific that literally signifies "old man." In DRC, the term, when used alone, often refers to Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
19. Erik Kennes, "A Road Not Taken? The Biography of Laurent Kabila (1939-2001)," in Klaas van Walraven, ed., *The Individual in African History: The Importance of Biography in African Historical Studies*, (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 282.
20. See, for example, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, *op. cit.*, 6, 8, 19.
21. Interview, PPRD activist, Kinshasa, June 20, 2021; interview, member of PPRD *bureau politique*, Kinshasa, June 22, 2022. Erik Kennes also writes that Laurent Kabila's discourse on self-reliance and independence from imperialist powers was "strangely at odds with the international neo-liberal climate at the time and seemed to come from another age," *ibid.*, 275.
22. Interview, PPRD member and former national minister, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021.



23. Gauthier de Villers and Jean Omasombo Tshonda, "An Intransitive Transition," *Review of African Political Economy* 93/94 (September-December 2002), 407. Laurent Kabila's collaborator and former minister of the interior, Mwenze Kongolo, also reflects this ambiguity in his book on Laurent Kabila. The afterword to his book on Laurent Kabila is titled "Joseph Kabila Kabange, or the pursuit of Mzee's struggle." Yet the content of the afterword has nothing to say about ideological continuity: it instead details, over several pages, the relationship between Joseph Kabila and his father, before concluding by addressing the controversy over Joseph Kabila's nationality, claiming that he is, indeed, his father's son. See Mwenze Kongolo, *Laurent-Désiré Kabila: Ma part de vérité: Témoignage pour l'histoire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).
24. Interview, Théophile Mbemba, Kinshasa, July 8, 2021.
25. Interview, PPRD member and former national minister, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021.
26. These likely included figures such as Gaëtan Kakudji, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Dominique Sakombi Inongo, and Pierre-Victor Mpoyo, who were all members of Kabila father's government, part of the CPP National Directorate, and were retained by Joseph Kabila. See de Villers and Omasombo, *op.cit.*, 409.
27. Interview, member of PPRD *bureau politique*, Kinshasa, June 22, 2021.
28. Interview, member of FCC leadership, Kinshasa, July 16, 2021; interview with two PPRD members, Kinshasa, July 9, 2021.
29. The figure of 601 registered political parties can be found in the final list transmitted to the *Commission électorale nationale indépendante* (CENI) of July 7, 2018, on file with CRG/Ebuteli.
30. With the modification of the party statutes in 2018, the post of secretary general became that of permanent secretary. The secretaries general are: Ghislain Chikez Diemu (2002-2004), Vital Kamerhe (2004-2007), Évariste Boshab (2007-2015), Henri Mova Sakanyi (2015-201), Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (2018-).
31. The threshold was the subject of an internal debate within the PPRD in 2017. Henri Mova Sakanyi, then PPRD secretary general, argued in favor of a 3% threshold, which was then part of a proposed change to the electoral law before the 2018 electoral cycle. Aubin Minaku, then president of the national assembly, argued against it. He warned that the 3% threshold would be voted down by parties allied with the PPRD, since it would likely prevent them from obtaining seats in the 2018 elections. See "Exclusif - Réforme électorale en RDC : un enregistrement sonore révèle la stratégie du parti de Kabila," *Jeune Afrique*, November 25, 2017; accessed November 16, 2011, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/496609/politique/exclusif-reforme-electorale-en-rdc-un-enregistrement-sonore-revele-la-strategie-du-parti-de-kabila/>.
32. See Annex III.
33. See Annex IV.
34. Electronic communication, PPRD member, November 11, 2022.
35. Interview, PPRD member, Kinshasa, July 9, 2021.
36. Interview, PPRD activist, Kinshasa, June 20, 2021.
37. These results do not include those fifteen MPs for Beni, Butembo and Yambi whose elections occurred in early 2019.
38. The results in this table do not reflect the outcomes of the various successful legal challenges to the results in certain districts, which slightly changed the totals reflected here.
39. See Bob Kabamba, Geoffrey Matagne and Pierre Verjans, "Premiers scrutins de la Troisième République Démocratique du Congo. Analyse des résultats," *Fédéralisme* 7(1), Annex I; accessed November 18, 2022, <https://popups.uliege.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=552#tocto2n2>.
40. This figure is equal to the PPRD % of total legislature, since the *mosaïque* had not yet been created before the 2006 electoral cycle.
41. Congolese historian Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem argues that the first political parties were extensions of the already existing "tribal groupings" that gained "new vigor" with the municipal elections in 1957. This continued with the general elections in 1960. See Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, 1998. *Histoire générale du Congo : De l'héritage ancien à la République Démocratique* (Paris: Duculot), 525.
42. P. Ngoma-Binda, J. Otemikongo Mandefu Yahisule and Leslie Moswa Mombo. "République démocratique du Congo. Démocratie et participation à la vie politique: Une évaluation des premiers pas de la IIIème République," Open Society Foundations, November 2010, 125.
43. Crawford Young and Terence Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 40-41, 43, 55.
44. "Manifeste de la N'Sele," 1967, pp. 9-10.
45. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*, Elizabeth Kanyogonya and Kevin Shillington, eds., (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1997).

46. Ngomba-Binda et al., *op. cit.*, p.126
47. See e.g. Jean-Pierre Kambila Kankwende wa Mpunga, Joseph Kabila Kabange: *Essai sur une idéologie du progrès* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2018). This book contains a discussion of the PPRD in the context of how Joseph Kabila's "Revolution of Modernity" program was an emanation of the PPRD's social democratic ideology. Former party secretary general Vital Kamerhe's 2006 book, *Pourquoi j'ai choisi Joseph Kabila*, contains only one page devoted to the PPRD. And in Henri Mova Sakanyi et al., *op. cit.*, four pages are devoted to the PPRD and AMP. A notable exception to this trend is Jean-Marie Elesse Bokokoma's critical work, *PPRD: Réimpulsion idéologique pour une bonne gouvernance* (Kinshasa: Editions CAP 2000, 2011).
48. See, for example, the relatively brief discussions of the PPRD in Gauthier de Villers, *République démocratique du Congo. De la guerre aux élections. L'ascension de Joseph Kabila et la naissance de la Troisième République (janvier 2001-août 2008)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009) which offers a scant four pages on the PPRD; and Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, *Nouvelle histoire du Congo. Des origines à la République démocratique* (Brussels: Le Cri, 2012).
49. Interview, PPRD member and former national minister, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021.
50. Éric Lukoki, "Minaku et Kimbuta ont empêché mon élection en 2018' (Théophile Mbemba)," *Top Congo*, July 25, 2021; accessed November 10, 2022, <http://mobile.topcongo.fm/article/minaku-et-kimbuta-ont-empêche-mon-election-en-2018-theophile-mbemba-8228>.
51. See "Kinshasa : Théophile Mbemba quitte le PPRD et crée son parti," *Radio Okapi*, December 30, 2021; accessed November 10, 2022, <https://www.radi-okapi.net/2021/12/30/actualite/politique/kinshasa-theophile-mbemba-quitte-le-pprd-et-cree-son-parti>.
52. Interview, former PPRD minister, August 22, 2021.
53. Joshua Z. Walker, "Kabila, Tshisekedi, and the War of Appearances," *Congo Research Group*, March 10, 2021; accessed November 17, 2022, <https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2022/11/17/kabila-tshisekedi-and-the-war-of-appearances/>.
54. Interview, PPRD youth activist, Kinshasa, June 16, 2021.
55. Interview, PPRD cadre, Kinshasa, June 22, 2021.
56. Interview, PPRD cadre, Kinshasa, June 23, 2021.
57. Interview, PPRD member and former national minister, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021. This interlocutor suggested the influence of the G15 has been exaggerated.
58. See République démocratique du Congo, *Actes du colloque sur la social-démocratie (Tome I)* (Cabinet du président de la République: Kinshasa: June 2006).
59. Léonard She Okitundu and Freddy Albert Mukoyi, *La social-démocratie: outil de la refondation de la République et de la citoyenneté* (Lausanne, Bellinzona, 2006).
60. Interview, PPRD member and former national minister, Kinshasa, July 22, 2021. (A17)
61. Ivan Kasongo, "RDC : le président de la ligue des jeunes du PPRD suspendu à titre 'conservatoire' de ses fonctions," *Actualité.cd*, January 31, 2021; accessed November 16, 2022, <https://actualite.cd/index.php/2021/01/31/rdc-le-president-de-la-ligue-des-jeunes-du-pprd-suspendu-titre-conservatoire-de-ses>.
62. Hervé Pedro, "PPRD : 'Ces échecs qui ont pour cyclomoteur Monsieur Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary » (Jimmy Ngalasi, FRC/PPRD), *www.politico.cd*, April 17, 2021; accessed November 16, 2022, <https://www.politico.cd/la-rdc-a-la-une/2021/04/17/les-echecs-du-pprd-ont-pour-cyclomoteur-emmanuel-ramazani-shadary-jimmy-ngalasi-frc-pprd.html/81743/>.
63. Ivan Kasongo, "RDC: Jimmy Ngalasi prône la vraie restructuration du PPRD avant les élections de 2023," *Actualité.cd*, June 29, 2021; accessed November 16, 2022, <https://actualite.cd/2021/06/19/rdc-jimmy-ngalasi-prone-la-vraie-restructuration-du-pprd-avant-les-elections-de-2023>.
64. See "Le PPRD de Joseph Kabila sera en congrès en format réduit en juin 2022," *Lequotidien.cd*, May 16, 2022; accessed October 22, 2022, <https://lequotidien.cd/le-pprd-de-joseph-kabila-sera-en-congres-en-format-reduit-en-juin-2022/>.
65. Interview, PPRD *bureau politique* member, Kinshasa, August 16, 2022.
66. Electronic communication, PPRD leader, August 29, 2022.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Interview, PPRD *bureau politique* member, August 16, 2022; see also Ivan Kasongo, "RDC : à l'issue d'une réunion dirigée par Joseph Kabila, le PPRD annonce la tenue de son congrès au mois de juin prochain," *Actualité.cd*, May 16, 2022; accessed November 18, 2022, <https://actualite.cd/2022/05/16/rdc-lissue-dune-reunion-dirigee-par-joseph-kabila-le-pprd-annonce-la-tenue-de-son>.
69. Telephone interview, PPRD member, September 6, 2022.



70. Interview, PPRD activist, June 29, 2021.
71. This oscillation also roughly maps onto the debates in Congo since the mid 1950s between proponents of unitarism and proponents of federalism—the chaos of the early 1960s led to Mobutu’s strong unitarism: “The Hobbesian diagnosis led to the Hobbesian remedy, the leviathan state and the unitary nation...” Crawford Young and Terence Turner. *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 1985, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 40-41, 43.
72. Philippe Biyoya Makutu and Rossy Mukendi Tshimanga, “Alliances et coalitions de partis politiques en République démocratique du Congo: Causes et conséquences,” *Journal of African Elections* 13:1, 211,
73. These parties were cited numerous times as sources of inspiration in interviews with PPRD cadres and members. They were also formally engaged with the PPRD. For example, the training seminar for grassroots party structure heads in Kananga in 2003 included representatives from the *Alliance des forces de progrès* (AFP, Senegal), ANC, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Tanzania), MPLA, SWAPO, and ZANU-PF. See PPRD, “Séminaire de formation des animateurs des structures de base du PPRD tenu à Kananga du 11 au 14 août 2003,” on file with CRG and Ebuteli. This point is echoed in a different way by Mova et al., who argue that the PPRD is close to these parties, as well as FRELIMO (Mozambique) and PCT (Congo-Brazzaville), due to its leftist ideology of social democracy, which aligns it with progressive African parties. See Henri Mova Sakanyi, Yvon Ramazani and Omer Nsongo, *De L.-D Kabila à J. Kabila: La vérité des faits!* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 109.
74. Interview with political office member, Kinshasa, April 7, 2022.
75. Interview with political office member, Kinshasa, April 7, 2022.
76. There were several minor modifications of the formulation of this text when the party statutes were updated in 2006, 2011, and 2018. The most significant is the insertion of a sentence in 2018 that reads: “Making our own the achievements of the multiparty system advocated in the historic speech of the president of the republic Joseph Kabila Kabange, initiator of the party, on January 26, 2001.”

The logo for Ebuteli, featuring the word "EBUTELI" in a bold, blue, sans-serif font, stacked vertically.

CONGO RESEARCH GROUP
GROUPE D'ÉTUDE SUR LE CONGO

Congo Research Group (CRG) was founded in 2015 to promote rigorous, independent research into the violence that affects millions of Congolese. This requires a broad approach. For us, the roots of this violence can be found in a history of predatory governance that dates back to the colonial period and that connects the hillsides of the Kivus with political intrigue and corruption in Kinshasa, as well as in the capitals of Europe, China, and North America. Today, CRG's research aims to explain the complicated inter-play among politics, violence, and political economy in the Congo to a wide audience.

Ebuteli is a Congolese research institute on politics, governance, and violence. Ebuteli ("staircase" in Lingala) aims to promote, through rigorous research, an informed debate to find solutions to the many challenges facing the DRC.

All of our publications, blogs and podcasts are available at
www.congoresearchgroup.org and www.ebuteli.org

Ebuteli, asbl

1, avenue de la paix, Immeuble SEDEC
Kinshasa, Commune de la Gombe
République Démocratique du Congo

 @ebuteli
www.ebuteli.org

Center on International Cooperation

726 Broadway, Suite 543
NY 10003, New York
USA

 @GEC_CRG
www.congoresearchgroup.org
www.cic.nyu.edu