KASAÏ AND KASAÏ CENTRAL

MONTHLY REPORT | JUNE 2019




Aerial view of Tshikapa

CONGO RESEARCH GROUP



GROUPE D'ÉTUDE SUR LE CONGO



MONTHLY REPORT | JUNE 2019

Highlights:

Kasaï: Supporters of Evariste Boshab dominate the provincial government led by governor Dieudonné Pieme, which has been contested by various ethnic groups and political parties

Kasaï Central: Urban insecurity continues in Kananga

Sankuru: Politically and legally disputed candidacies for the gubernatorial election

A. Political and Security Situation in Kasaï, Kasaï Central and Sankuru

Political tensions continued in Kasaï, Kasaï Central, and Sankuru in June. These were mainly due to fractures within the Front commun pour le Congo (FCC) and Cap pour le changement (CACH) political coalitions.

The governor of Kasaï, Dieudonné Pieme, who is a member of the FCC, announced his cabinet on June 24 and the members of his government the following day. This announcement came more than a month after his return to Tshikapa after having taken part in the provincial governors' meeting with president Tshisekedi in Kinshasa. His government is composed of 10 members, unlike the government which preceded his, that had only five members. The government was immediately contested by various parties – <u>not unlike the controversy surrounding the</u> <u>government of Kasaï Central</u> in May.

Name	Ministry	Party	Territory/City	Community
Deller Kawino Ndongo	Interior, Security and Customary Affairs	PPRD	Tshikapa City	Pende
François Tshitambala Tshitenge	Finance and Procurement	CAAC	Tshikapa/Kamonia	Nyambi (Lubaphone)
Olivier Tombe Tombe	Public Works and Infrastructure	PPRD	Luebo	Lubaphone
Nancy Bokele Bokako	Budget, Planning and Tourism	PPRD	Dekese	Ndengese
Céphas Kalumba Mabosho	Social and Humanitarian Affairs and Development	PPRD	Mweka	Kete
Romain Mutombo Mutombo	New Technologies and Communication	UDPS	Tshikapa/Kamonia	Lubaphone
Kabamba Mukinayi	Sports, Culture and Leisure, and Arts	PPRD	Luebo	Lubaphone
Mapaya Makoro	Mining and Energy	PPRD	llebo	Lele
Pauline Mbidi Ndondo	Gender, Family, Health and Citizenship	PPRD	Mweka	Ngongo
Camille Tidanga Ipota Bembela	Interprovincial and Inter-community Relations	PPRD	Dekese	Ndengese

Several lessons can be drawn from the composition of the government and the controversies that ensued:

The FCC Dominates the New Government

The first lesson to be taken from analyzing the government of Dieudonné Pieme is the predominant number of FCC members, particularly those from the PPRD (eight out of 10). Alongside the one minister from the *Congrès des alliés pour l'action au Congo* (CAAC, the political party of the former governor of Kasaï Central, Alex Kande), the FCC has nine of the government's 10 ministries. CACH has been left with a single ministry, which was given to the *Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social* (UDPS). The *Union pour la nation congolaise* (UNC) youth, the party of Vital Kamerhe (the president's chief of staff), therefore revolted against the exclusion of their political party from the provincial government.¹ And the UDPS Mweka federation also planned a protest march which did not take place, since it was cancelled by local authorities.

Despite the controversy, this distribution of ministries corresponds more or less to the make-up of the Kasaï provincial assembly, where the FCC has 25 seats and three affiliated customary chiefs, while CACH has only four seats.

The Biggest Controversy Around Pieme's Government Lies in the Distribution of Ministries Among the Province's Ethnic Groups

The first community to protest was the **Bindji** ethnic group in Tshikapa. On June 27, it issued a "message of outrage" announcing its "outright rejection" of Pieme's government, because of what it described as its "planned marginalization (...) by the so-called natives" of the province.² The Bindji community did not obtain a single ministry.³

The next protest against Pieme's government came from **Dekese** territory political elites based in Kinshasa. In a June 28 memorandum, they denounced the fact that their territory's "quota" was filled entirely by family members of the national deputy Adrien Bokele Djema (Dekese). They pointed out that Dekese's two ministers, Nancy Bokele Bokako and Camille Tidanga Epota Bembela (out of the 10 members of the government) as well as a member of the governor's cabinet, Fidèle Mbeyelola Ekfolo, were all related to Bokele Djema, and all from the Ngelendjale groupement.⁴ On the same day, **Chokwe** and **Lunda** political elites and customary chiefs also expressed their dissatisfaction, accusing Dieudonné Pieme of insulting them for not appointing a member of their community. They asked him to revoke the nomination of his government.⁵

In addition to the demands mentioned above by some of the province's ethnic groups, the death of the driver of Mr. Amadou Kabaseke, Provincial Director (DP) of the Direction générale de migration (DGM) in Kasaï has added fuel to the fire. Mr. Kabaseke's wife killed his driver June 27, allegedly because he had been facilitating her husband's infidelity. His wife has since been arrested and is awaiting trial; people from Ilebo, the victim's territory of origin, are demanding justice and a fair trial. The family members of the deceased have also demanded the arrest of the DP for "non-assistance of a person in danger and accomplice to murder".⁶

Due to the current context, the case has taken on a political dimension. Since the driver's death, messages have been circulating on social networks, demanding justice for llebo territory. People from this territory, especially the Lele community, had already been expressing their frustrations following what they viewed as their under-representation in Pieme's government. When the DP's driver, who is from Ilebo, was killed, the affair was quickly politicized. One of the messages circulating on social networks asked: "... What price must Ilebo territory pay for the province of Kasaï?" In this way, a man's death linked to a domestic dispute has become a political murder.

Other tensions that have emerged in the province are related to taxes and revenue management. At the end of May, a controversy erupted over the agricultural goods export tax imposed by the Direction générale des recettes du Kasaï (DGRKAS). The DGRKAS had increased the tax from 250,000 CDF to 450,000 CDF. Governor Pieme decided to cancel the increase, which was deemed detrimental to the province's economy, on May 26.

Subsequently, the Director General (DG) of the DGRKAS, François Mukanyim, was summoned by the provincial assembly for oral questions. During parliamentary debate, it was shown that DGRKAS revenues had been mismanaged; the DG confessed that he had been working under pressure from his political party, the PPRD, as well as other high-ranking politicians from the province.⁷ François Mukanyim resigned on June 10. His deputy, Robert Mashiki, was subsequently dismissed by Governor Pieme for not reporting his superior's mismanagement.

Political and Security Tensions in Kasaï Central

Kasaï Central has not been spared from political disputes. Following the <u>PPRD's protest against</u> <u>the composition of the provincial government in May</u>, UDPS supporters demonstrated in Kananga on June 22, demanding 40% of the provincial ministries.⁸ Governor Martin Kabuya has his work cut out for him. He needs to respond not only to the PPRD's demands PPRD (the party with 11 of the 33 seats in the provincial assembly), but also now to those of the UDPS.

The second source of political controversy in Kasaï Central has been the manner in which Kabuya has been firing certain government officials. On June 26, a handful of heads of the province's health zones (zones de santé) wrote to the president of the provincial assembly, denouncing their dismissal in some cases and demotion in others.⁹ Subsequently, on July 1, managers in the Direction générale des recettes (the province's tax office) were also fired. Ten other managers from the same agency were arrested at the governor's office on his orders after he had invited them there for a meeting. They were accused of embezzlement and financial malpractice.¹⁰ Four were released and six were sent to jail, where they are being held by the Kananga public prosecutor's office. All these firings prompted a local NGO, the Ligue nationale paysanne des droits de l'homme (LINAPEDHO), to denounce Kabuya's arbitrary management of the province.¹¹ The provincial assembly then convened a special session to study the governor's draft edict on the status of state agents and civil servants in the province. Finally, it is important to note that the former vice-governor, Manif Kabuanga, has filed a complaint against Martin Kabuya, which accuses him of embezzling the salaries of the members of the outgoing provincial government.

In terms of security, another escape from the Kananga prison was reported on June 19, after two previous escapes on May 7 and 9. The previous escapes led to the transfer of 44 prisoners to Kinshasa and Equateur provinces, as well as to Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR) cells.¹² Following the most recent escape, the authorities decided to relocate the prisoners. On June 28, 115 detainees were transferred to an army camp on the orders of "the highest authority in the country," according to the provincial minister of justice, while others were sent to the ANR in Kananga.¹³

Besides continued prison escapes, urban insecurity in Kananga has also persisted, as CRG also reported in May.¹⁴ Among the most significant events was the theft of a vehicle, computers, and a safe from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on June 16.¹⁵

Lastly, three state agents, including an army officer, were indicted by a military tribunal for the murder of UN experts. The officer in question is Colonel Jean de Dieu Mambweni. Along with inspectors from the DGM, he was charged with terrorism, involvement in an insurrectional movement, wartime murder by mutilation, and violation of orders.¹⁶ For the moment, the trial date has not yet been set.

Sankuru: Legal Disputes Surrounding Candidates for the Gubernatorial Election

In Sankuru, there have been protracted legal battles in June around the candidates for the gubernatorial election. The Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) announced that the election would take place on July 10.¹⁷ This date will now likely be moved again, to July 20, for security reasons.¹⁸ The initial delay was due to legal disputes surrounding the candidacy of Joseph-Stéphane Mukumadi, the sole challenger to Lambert Mende, Joseph Kabila's former minister of communication. Mukumadi's candidacy had been invalidated March 3 by the Sankuru court of appeal on the grounds that he has another nationality besides that of the DRC. The protest against his candidacy had been lodged with the court by Mende's political party, the Convention des Congolais unis (CCU). As a result, Lambert Mende remained the only candidate for governor. This situation was deplored by other influential members of the PPRD from Sankuru, who did not tolerate Mende becoming governor.

Thus, the poll, which was initially scheduled for April 10 with only one candidate, was suspended by the Council of State.¹⁹ The latter then instructed the CENI to reinstate Mukumadi's candidacy. But the electoral commission did not do so when it rescheduled the election for April 13. Thus, the Superior Judicial Council took up the case, and overturned the Council of State's decision. Following a meeting between president Tshisekedi and a group of Sankuru politicians, the CENI decided on a new election date (July 10) and reinstated Mukumadi.²⁰ What happened next? Mende's CCU party announced on June 27 that it would file a complaint with the Constitutional Court to contest CENI's decision.²¹

For the moment, however, it appears that the election will go ahead with both candidates.

B. Humanitarian Situation

As CRG noted in its last monthly report, accurate IDP figures for Kasaï, as for the rest of the Congo, are difficult to obtain. The latest statistics published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) date from November 2018.²² All publicly available publicly are those of the DGM.

Province ²³	Number of displaced individuals in 2016	Number of displaced individuals in 2017	Number of displaced individuals in 2018
Kasaï	36 323	369 066	45 729
Kasaï Central	71 804	483 906	214 813
Kasaï Oriental	17 684	61 230	34 440
Lomami	40 449	182 753	54 473
Sankuru	35 435	41 752	18 126

Another interesting datum is the total number of villages that were destroyed, partially destroyed or emptied of their population for the period between 2016 and 2018:

Province ²⁴	Number of villages destroyed	Number of villages partially destroyed	Number of villages emptied of their inhabitants
Kasaï	81	1 164	70
Kasaï Central	237	3 238	28
Kasaï Oriental	81	134	2
Lomami	32	464	13
Sankuru	21	303	30

These data show two clear trends. First, for the period from 2016 to 2018, the majority of displacement in the Kasaï region took place in 2017, during the peak of the armed conflict. Second, Kasaï Central has been the province most affected by population movement.

Returnees from Angola have constituted the largest group of displaced persons in the Kasaï region since 2018.²⁵ The latest statistics provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicate that between October 2018 and the end of May 2019, 428,304 people returned from Angola to six provinces in the DRC. Of these, Kasaï province received 62% according to the official figures provided by the DGM. OCHA reported in June 2019 that an average of approximately 50 people per day have continued to arrive from Angola since March 2019.

C. Analysis and Recommendations

In each of the three provinces mentioned in this report, there have been political disputes related to the composition of provincial governments and, in the case of Sankuru, the gubernatorial election. The nature of the different controversies needs to be examined in order to gain a deeper understanding of the political dynamics in each of these provinces.

In its <u>May 2019 monthly report</u> on the Kasaï region, CRG noted that the government appointed by governor Martin Kabuya in **Kasaï Central** had sparked controversy. This was due to the absence of PPRD members, despite its status as the party with the largest number of seats in the provincial assembly. Instead, Kabuya's government is dominated by politicians from Ensemble pour le changement, and more specifically those belonging to the political parties of two important national deputies from the province: Delly Sesanga and Claudel André Lubaya. The challenges to Kabuya's government were therefore related to the representativeness of different political parties and coalitions.

However, in **Kasa**ï, the political challenges are different. There, tensions surrounding the provincial government have occurred due to the perceived lack of representativeness of various territories and ethnic groups and, to a lesser extent, the absence of certain political parties and coalitions. This difference between Kasaï and Kasaï Central can be attributed to the relatively large number of ethnic groups in Kasaï, without there being one with a clear demographic majority. The Unité Kasaïenne province, created in 1962, whose borders partly overlap those of the current Kasaï province, was conceived as a way of bringing together minority ethnic groups in order to create a bloc in the face of a Lubaphone majority in the region corresponding to the former province of Kasaï Occidental.

Before the creation of the newly decentralized provinces in 2015, politicians from the future Kasaï province met at the Centre Nganda in Kinshasa to discuss the distribution of provincial institutions among different ethnic groups. This question came to a head under former governor Marc Manyanga, who was in open conflict with his vice-governor, Hubert Mbingho.²⁶

Today, these conflicts have returned in the form of protests by different ethnic groups and political parties against the make-up of the provincial government. This is a symptom of the province's fragmentation. This also explains why it took so long to announce the members of the governor's cabinet and provincial ministers. But it does not seem to have been possible to please everyone.

Despite attempts to satisfy different ethnic groups and major political parties, there has been one omission of particular note from the government: that of the Kuba community, which is made up of different sub-groups, including the Bushoong, Ngende, Ngongo, and Mpiang. This is difficult to explain since governor Pieme is himself Kuba, as is his political sponsor, Evariste Boshab. This is all the more surprising since three of the national deputies from Mweka are Bushoong, and four of the six provincial deputies from Mweka are also Bushoong.

In a logic of ethnic calculation, one would expect to find members of the Kuba community in the government representing **Mweka** territory, in order for Boshab and Pieme to exert influence. Yet there is only one Kuba minister in the new government: Pauline Mbidi Ndondo, the Minister of Gender, Family, Health and Civic Affairs (Ngongo from **Mweka**).

It appears that Boshab and Pieme's strategy is to exert their influence via allies from other ethnic groups, in order to avoid accusations of "tribalism." Only the executive secretary of the provincial government, Jacob Pemebelongo Bomilongo, who has the rank of minister, and Pieme's adviser for political and customary issues, Celestin Nono Katumba, are Kuba. Pembelongo is Ngende from Bolempo (Boshab's *groupement*) who also has close relations with the Mpiang on his mother's side. Nono Katumba is Mpiang from Kakenge (Mweka) and a cousin of governor Pieme.

Boshab's allies in the government therefore mainly hail from other ethnic groups than his own (see above table): Kawino Ndongo, Tombe Tomb, Bokele Bokako, Kalumba Mabosho, Kabamba Mukinayi, Mbidi Ndondo and Tedanga Ipota Bembela. Mapaya Makoro was recommended by Jeunesse Mandjuandjua, a Boshab ally and national deputy from Ilebo. The struggle for political influence in Kasaï between the camps of Evariste Boshab and Maker Mwangu thus continues. As a result, the suspension of the DGRKAS DG's deputy constituted political revenge: the former DG is a Boshab ally. His deputy, Robert Mashiki, had been promoted by former vice-governor Hubert Mbingho, himself a Mwangu ally. Mashiki, Mbingho, and Mwangu are all from the Pende community in Kasaï.

In **Kasaï Central**, the political situation has a different tone. While ethnic disputes surrounding Dieudonné Pieme's choice of ministers in Kasaï have been the most prevalent, in Kananga, critics of how governor Martin Kabuya is managing the province have dominated public debate. In the first case, ethnic tensions manifested themselves through politics. In the second, grievances emerged surrounding Kabuya's governance; these were more related to his personal behavior and to how he is apparently using his position to take revenge against his political opponents. For example, Kabuya's convening of a special session of the provincial assembly on July 1 to examine a draft audit on the status of civil servants appears to be a tactic to formalize and legitimize his recent firings of government employees.²⁷

The pressures around Mukumadi's candidacy in **Sankuru** reflect yet another dynamic: that of political struggles that are simultaneously intra-ethnic and within the same political party. Among the Tetela there are two groups in conflict: the so-called Tetela from the "savannah" and those from the "forest." In addition, there are struggles within the FCC. Former minister Lambert Mende is being obstructed by other influential Tetela FCC members: Leonard She Okitundu, Jean-Charles Okoto Lolakombe, and Adolphe Onusumba. All three support Mukumadi, a so-called "savannah" Tetela like Okitundu and Onusumba. Only Okoto is a so-called "forest" Tetela. This configuration reflects how ethnic identity influences, but does not dictate, political alliances. As a result, in Sankuru, the political management of the province is being played out exclusively within the same ethnic group and the same political coalition, the FCC.

Recommendations

Political tensions in **Kasaï Central** and **Kasaï**, which in some cases take on an ethnic dimension, should be the subject of *regular exchanges between local populations and political leaders in provincial assemblies and the government*. These could take place once a month, for example, and should be facilitated by local or international NGOs in Kasaï. These partners should organize the exchanges: i) so that it is not necessarily always the same representatives of the population who are represented, in order to obtain a diversity of opinions, and ii) with well-defined agendas to ensure that the key issues are addressed. These exchanges could be organized as forums for popular expression by local civil society organizations. Local media can also be used to help people learn more about the management of these provinces.

In the case of **Sankuru**, political actors should interpret the crisis not only as a legal one, but also as a political one. That is, the solution to the problem must not be found in the judicial system, as is the case now, where political conflicts are being played out through legal actions. The organization of the gubernatorial election can only be seen as a phase towards escalating or decreasing political tensions with an ethnic dimension. Thus, it is first necessary to organize a framework for dialogue among the actors involved (including the Kinshasa-based puppeteers) with the involvement of different members of the local communities of Sankuru, who should represent the diversity of political opinions.

The initiatives described above could draw inspiration from the work done by an NGO in the Kivus called *Leadership cohésif*, which has already worked on conflict resolution with local and national actors. The lesson they learned from their experience is the importance of creating informal spaces and forums for dialogue, where actors can freely exchange and get deeper into the causes of problems and ways to solve them.

ENDNOTES

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<u>2 Communauté bindji de Tshikapa « Cobitshi». « Message d'indignation », 27 juin 2019, http://congoresearchgroup.org/message-dindignation-de-la-communaute-bindji-de-tshikapa/?lang=fr. See also https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-53199_kasai_executif provincial le depute kalala_indigne_de_la_non_representativite_de_la_communaute_bindi_de_tshikapa.html</u>

<u>3 It is worth remembering that the Bindji community in Kasaï is often considered to be "foreign" to the province by other ethnic groups, even though they have been present there for approximately a century.</u>

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Loangatshimo River (Kasai)

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